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Auditors and the Permissive Society: Market Failure, Globalisation and 
Financial Regulation in the US.
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Introduction 
 
On 2 December 2001, Enron, the Houston based energy trading company, filed for 
bankruptcy protection. The nature and scale of Enron’s bankruptcy was, at the time, 
unprecedented. Enron had come into existence in 1985 as the product of a merger 
between two gas pipeline companies. Massive debts initially held back growth in the 
new company. But a decision to transform the business into a financial institution in 
the late 1980s provided a substantial lift to the company’s earnings which was soon 
reflected in an extraordinary rise in the price of its shares (Fox, 2002; Bratton, 2002). 
Between January 1991 and January 1993, Enron’s stock rose 75 per cent, and before 
1993 had run its course, Enron’s stock rose above $50 a share for the first time (Fox, 
2002: 47). By August 2000, when Enron’s stock reached a high of $90.75, the 
company was the seventh largest in the US by market capitalisation (Staff to the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002: 72). Not only, however, had Enron 
become one of the US’s leading corporations, it had also developed a reputation ‘as 
America’s corporate shock troop’ for urging ‘radical reliance on market discipline’ 
and the dismantling the New Deal regulatory legacy (Bratton, 2002: 7 and 17; 
Business Week, December 2001). The combined effect of the rapid growth of the 
company and its success in driving back the boundaries of federal and state regulation 
led Fortune Magazine to rank Enron as the country’s most innovative for six years 
and probably explains why its CEO, Jeff Skilling, was voted the second best chief 
executive in the US in August 2001. Despite these plaudits, however, Enron’s status 
as a symbol of the confidence of US corporations in the late twentieth century was 
brief. By the end of September 2001, the company’s shares were quoted at just $25. 
Exactly a month later they were trading at $13.90 and, by the end of the next month, 
on November 30th, they were quoted at 26 cents (Bratton, 2002: 41-42). Two days 
later the company filed for bankruptcy protection. 
 
Not only was the loss of shareholder equity, in excess of $60 billion (Fox, 2002: 264), 
immense, but, with assets of $62 billion, Enron was also the largest company to 
declare bankruptcy protection in US history (Staff to the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 2002: 71; Ribstein, 2002). Over the months that followed the 
full extent of the company’s attempts to manage its earnings, still the best explanation 
for both the spectacular rise and sharp decline in its fortunes (Bratton, 2002: 22-54), 
became apparent. Put simply, from 1997 Enron fraudulently managed its reported 
accounts to make it look like the company had more revenue and earnings, less debt 
and greater operating cash flow (Powers et al, 2002; Bratton, 2002). The sums 
involved in some of the accounting schemes were, like the decline in the company’s 
share price and its bankruptcy, huge. For example, Enron’s attempts to disguise loans 
as commodity trades accounted for an estimated $7-8 billion in what have been 
alleged to be improperly recorded liabilities and cash flow.2 Likewise, when Enron 
restated its earnings for the period 1997 to 2001 to bring a number of hitherto 
concealed subsidiaries back on to the company’s consolidated accounts, the effect was 
to reduce reported net income by $586 million (or 20 per cent of its earnings for the 
period) and increase reported debt by a massive $2.6 billion (Fox, 2002: 275-277). But 
although the sums involved in Enron’s false accounting were vast, the loss of 
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shareholder equity breath-taking and the company’s bankruptcy unprecedented, Enron 
was not, in the event, exceptional (Ribstein, 2002: 8). 
 
On the contrary, five of the largest bankruptcies in US history (including Enron) 
occurred in 2002 (The Guardian, 19 December 2002). Moreover, other large frauds at 
other large companies were discovered soon after as was the need for several major 
companies to restate their accounts. These included the telecommunications 
companies Global Crossing, Qwest Communications and Worldcom (which quickly 
surpassed Enron as the largest bankruptcy in US history), as well as Tyco 
International, Adelphia,  Dynergy, Rite-Aid and Xerox. More interestingly perhaps, 
Enron’s fall was immediately preceded by a host of other cases such as Sunbeam, 
Cendant and Waste Management, all of which had involved massive frauds and 
accounting restatements. The simple fact was that corporate America had been laid 
waste by deception, false accounting and bankruptcy. This fact (and the fact that in 
many cases these frauds were not so deeply embedded within the corporations 
concerned or so complex that the deceptions could not have been uncovered long 
before they actually emerged)3 imposed some important constraints on the political 
debate that followed. Put simply, it became very difficult for those unsympathetic to 
reform to argue that the regulatory failure involved was an isolated fault of an 
otherwise reliable system. This was especially true given that in most cases the 
institutions with formal responsibility for regulating the capital markets either did not 
discover the frauds or did not report them to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the lead regulatory body in the US (Ribstein, 2002). Not only, in short, did the 
watchdogs not bark, but their collective silence suggested systemic failure (Healy and 
Palepu, 2002; Bratton, 2002: 59-62; Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, 2002: 2). The key question, of course, is why? 
 
The following analysis aims to address this question as part of a wider discussion 
which asks whether the internationalisation of the world’s capital markets (and the 
attendant massive expansion in the movement of capital), so often the cause of 
disabling financial disasters (Bello et. al, 2000), helps us to make sense of this 
regulatory failure. The basic conclusion of the analysis is that, in many important 
respects, it does not. More specifically, while there is some, quite persuasive, 
evidence to suggest that liberalisation of capital flows is deeply implicated in the 
emergence of what a former chair of the SEC once described as the ‘numbers’ game’ 
(and, therefore, by implication in many of the recent cases of accounting fraud), it 
does not really help us to understand why there was such a complete failure in the 
SEC’s ability to anticipate and prevent such a large number of huge corporate frauds 
(Doug, 1997; Levitt, 1998). Instead, this paper contends that to understand most of the 
recent examples of regulatory failure we need to focus, in the first instance, on the 
structure of the current system of financial regulation in the US (which was forged 
long before the present liberalisation of the world’s capital markets) and the domestic 
political context in which it operates. Only then should we look at the greater 
economic uncertainties and more acute competitive pressures that tend to characterise 
the current system of globalised finance. The main focus of the analysis is on the 
accounting profession since this, arguably, represents the most independent of the 
private institutions responsible for fraud surveillance (see below). The discussion 
begins with a brief summary of the structure of financial regulation in the US. There 
then follows a section that looks at the limits to detecting corporate fraud through 
auditing. The final part of the discussion attempts to explain these limits in terms of 
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the historical development of the accounting profession, the legal context in which it 
operates, and the uneven nature of ‘corporate colonisation’ in US government and 
financial regulation (Bloggs, 2000). 
 
Accounting for Growth: Corporations, Audits and Financial Reporting 
 
Financial Regulation: A Public-Private Partnership? 
 
The system of financial regulation in the US is based on a two-tier system of control. 
This comprises the SEC, on the one hand, and a range of unrelated private institutions, 
on the other. In principle, these private institutions – which include non-executive 
directors, investment banking firms, commercial lawyers, security analysts, credit 
rating agencies and auditors – are expected to work in partnership with the SEC to 
regulate the US’s vast capital markets. In some respects they are of secondary 
importance to the SEC which (in addition to being responsible for enforcement) 
performs what is, in effect, a supervisory role, issuing rules and guidance to regulated 
corporations as well as to other organisations involved in financial regulation. In other 
respects, however, particularly fraud surveillance, they play a far more important role 
than the SEC. This is because, with approximately only 3000 employees, the SEC is 
simply not adequately organised or funded for the purposes of reviewing, inspecting 
and analysing corporations and their accounts. Its role, in fraud surveillance and 
detection at least, is, therefore, peripheral, leaving the actual practice of uncovering 
corporate fraud to private institutions like securities analysts and investment banks 
(Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002: 1-2; 8-18). 
  
It is this basic premise of financial regulation in the US – that the detection of fraud 
can be left to private commercial organisations that are neither positioned nor 
organisationally motivated to uncover fraud – which ultimately explains the 
regulatory failure in the US. Certainly, in light of recent events, the assumption that 
securities analysts or investment banking firms might perform a major role in fraud 
detection now seems perverse. At the very least, it is an assumption that seems to be 
distinguished by its refusal to recognise the real nature and strategic position of these 
institutions relative to the corporations that they are ostensibly meant to regulate 
(ibid). The same argument, however, cannot be so easily made about auditors. On the 
contrary, the requirement that company accounts are externally audited to ensure that 
public companies prepare financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the securities laws in the US4 seems to represent 
an important layer of fraud surveillance. This, at least, is the broad effect of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which assumes that auditors will detect fraud and report 
their suspicions either to the company board or the SEC. It was also understood as a 
basic component of the auditor’s role in the Supreme Court decision of United States 
v Arthur Young & Co. which held that auditors owe ‘ultimate allegiance to the 
corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public’. The audit 
process, therefore, appears to be qualitatively distinct from investment banking, credit 
rating or the analysis of securities in that the essence of the enterprise is characterised 
by a legal duty which not only implies that the auditing firm has ‘total independence 
from the client’, but which also suggests that audit firms assume ‘a public 
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client’.5  
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On closer inspection, however, there is less to distinguish auditors from the SEC’s 
other private sector regulatory partners than might first appear. In fact, both the 
assumption of independence and the idea that auditors might play an active role in the 
detection of corporate fraud seems to be based on a poor understanding of the basic 
conflict of interest that characterises the relationship between auditor and audit client, 
wishful disregard for how the evolution of accounting firms into multi-disciplinary 
commercial organisations has compounded this conflict of interest and an 
unwillingness to come to terms with the prevailing organisational culture of auditing 
firms. 
 
The Independent Auditor? 
 
An audit firm’s capacity to ensure that its client complies with GAAP  - as well as its 
ability to make certain that the firm itself discharges its responsibilities to the 
company’s shareholders and creditors – is dependent on two related factors. The first 
concerns the auditor’s independence from the corporate client, whilst the second 
concerns its capacity to unearth questionable accounting methods. Auditors, in other 
words, must be able to access and understand the unprocessed data upon which a 
company has based its accounts and, just as importantly, be able to object if the 
company’s calculations are misleading or in violation of GAAP. Both are 
compromised by the fundamental tension that all auditors necessarily face. This arises 
because neither existing nor prospective corporate creditors and shareholders (which 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Arthur Young assumed the audit firm owes 
primary allegiance) pay for the audit. The effect is that the auditors’ independence, as 
well as its ability to demand the production and satisfactory explanation of basic 
commercial and financial data, is potentially undermined ‘simply by accepting [the] 
audit engagement’ (O’Connor, 2002: 2) since future income from auditing is 
dependent on the renewal of existing contracts for service. 
 
Independence and the Multidisciplinary Professional Service Organisation 
 
This basic conflict of interest seems important to understanding accountants’ 
traditional failure to prevent corporate fraud because it appears to privilege the 
development of a conciliatory, rather than adversarial, relationship between a 
corporate client and its auditor. However, it is important not to overstate the structural 
constraints that the audit-client relationship imposes on auditor independence. This is 
because, once contracted, an audit firm is very difficult to dismiss. Corporations in the 
US are now required to formally disclose that the contract with their auditor has been 
terminated which inevitability invites greater scrutiny and can potentially bring into 
question the veracity of the corporation’s accounts. Thus, there exist important 
disincentives that operate to deter corporations from exploiting the basic conflict of 
interest that characterises the auditor-client relationship (Gordon, 2002: 6-7). 
 
In many respects, however, these disincentives (insofar as they exist) have been 
neutralised as audit firms have evolved into multi-disciplinary professional service 
organisations with audit, tax and consulting divisions. Quite how this has occurred 
will be considered below, but for the present it is important to appreciate the extent of 
this important transformation. In the mid 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission, 
concerned about the emergence of a potential oligopoly by the large accounting firms, 
required the profession to change its standards to allow audit firms to advertise and 
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compete aggressively with each other for clients. Audit firms responded by competing 
on price, focusing on cost cutting and, importantly, expanding into new areas (Healy 
and Palepu, 2002: 19). By the beginning of the current decade (before the major 
accounting firms began to divest themselves of their consulting businesses) the 
consulting divisions of the major accounting firms offered a wide variety of services, 
ranging from corporate finance to factory automation (O’Connor, 2002: 53-62; Wall 
Street Journal, 6 February 2002). More importantly, because revenue from auditing 
among the large accounting firms remained relatively constant during the 1990s, 
expansion became dependant on increasing revenue from non-audit work. Audit 
firms, like Andersen, began to encourage growth of the business by persuading 
partners to sell non-audit services to audit clients and linking the remuneration of 
partners to their generation of new business. Non-audit work proliferated. By 1999, 
only $9.5 billion, or 37 per cent, of the combined revenue of the five largest 
accounting firms in the US ($26 billion) was attributable to accounting (Coffee Jr., 
2001: 14). 
 
This relative decline in audit revenue and the related transformation in the nature of 
the accounting business had three important related effects. The first, and arguably 
most important effect, as indicated above, has been to neutralise the risks associated 
with controlling an audit firm through the potential, implied or explicit threat of 
dismissal. The cross selling of consulting services has given corporations an 
alternative means of exercising control over the audit process. Not only has it meant 
that more revenue is at risk when an audit firm objects to a company’s figures, but it 
is also the case that the audited corporation can exert commercial pressure on the 
audit firm - by threatening to withhold, not renew or not seek consulting services – 
without the risk of formal public disclosure (Gordon, 2002: 6-7). The diversification 
of accounting firms, in other words, has created an opportunity for corporations to 
manipulate and control their auditors without risk of greater public scrutiny. 
 
Poor performing audit revenue and the related shift in focus of accounting business 
also led to a deterioration in the quality of audits. This was, in part, because audit 
firms began to develop standard operating procedures so that variation in audit quality 
could be reduced, costs lowered and the risk of litigation minimised. Auditing, in 
short, became commodified. And, as firms attempted to maximise declining audit 
revenue through higher volumes whilst at the same time offering audit services at 
marginal or below cost (to facilitate business relationships with companies in the hope 
that this would lead to highly profitable consulting contracts), the quality of audits 
deteriorated. This decline in quality intensified as a result of changes to both the 
remuneration of accountants and the basic form of accounting standards. 
Remuneration and promotion became more closely linked to attracting new audit 
clients and retaining existing ones. This tended to place a premium on good 
relationships with top management, rather than professional integrity or technical 
expertise, and had the effect of discouraging adversarial auditors and, therefore, 
adversarial audits. Changes in the basic form of accounting standards tended to 
facilitate this process. Large accounting firms persistently lobbied for more 
particularistic accounting standards to make it easier for them to verify that their 
clients’ financial reports satisfied GAAP . This was aimed at reducing the risk of 
litigation. However, it also made it possible for balance sheets to become 
disaggregated, allowing each successive transaction to be assessed against GAAP in 
isolation. Auditing, as such, became a more perfunctory exercise, less forensic based 
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more concerned with audit rules and less concerned with the relationship between 
financial transactions and the fundamental value of the audited company (Healy and 
Palepu, 2002: 19-20; Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002: 
13; Coffee, 2001 and 2002: 14-15; McEnroe and Martens, 2001). 
 
The third and final major effect to arise from the evolution of audit firms into multi-
disciplinary professional service firms involved a much broader transformation in the 
organisational culture of accounting firms (Wall Street Journal, 12 March 2002). This 
cultural transformation became most visibly apparent during the dot.com boom during 
the mid 1990s when accountants, traditionally a conservative profession, began to 
embrace the risk taking culture of the new economy and lobbied fiercely for changes 
in accounting rules to reflect, what they alleged, was the hidden value of new 
economy firms (Langewoort, 2002). But, according to Jeffery Gordon, the main cause 
of this cultural transformation has been audit firms’ provision of tax advice. Tax 
planning, he argues, carried over into “accounting planning” – a process in which the 
accountant interprets accounting rules to maximise reported income irrespective of 
whether the corporation’s fundamental value is misrepresented. Accounting rules, like 
the tax rules, in short, become the subject of professional manipulation. This, of 
course, was made possible by the trend towards more particularistic accounting 
standards. Moreover, because it meant that the process of auditing became regarded as 
a value-added service, rather than a statutorily imposed cost, it also blurred the 
boundaries between the audit and audited firm as accountants at once came to regard 
themselves and be regarded as part of the management team6 - a process that further 
undermined the potential for adversarial audits (Gordon, 2002: 7-8). 
 
Put simply, the business and regulatory environment in which auditors have come to 
operate in the US have served to compromise their independence and undermine both 
their capacity and motivation to uncover fraud or object to the management of 
corporate earnings. These effects are clearly observable in what occurred at Enron. 
Accounting rules for reporting Special Purpose Entities, for example, were 
mechanical and failed to reflect the real economics of Enron’s transactions. 
Andersen’s relationship with Enron also provides a convincing explanation for 
Andersen’s multiple violation of GAAP. Its financial dependence on Enron business 
was considerable. In 2001 Andersen received just $25 million in audit fees from 
Enron. This contrasted with the $27 million it received for consulting fees. This not 
only made Enron Andersen’s second largest client in the US, but it also underlies 
what was an intimate relationship. Andersen had designed Enron’s internal 
compliance system. Auditors and consultants were permanently posted in Enron 
offices. Andersen also obtained $5.7 million for advice relating to Chewco and LJM-
related transactions, which were at the centre of some of the main allegations of false 
accounting. Furthermore, senior Enron executives responsible for accounting had 
themselves been recruited from Andersen. It was not, however, simply the partners in 
Houston, where Enron was based, who were complicit in Enron’s earnings 
management. Senior partners at Andersen’s Chicago office were consulted on and 
approved many of Enron’s off balance sheet transactions, noting, as they did, that fees 
from Enron could soon amount to $100 million a year. Andersen’s motivations were 
clearly conflicted. When the credit risks at the special purpose entities became clear, 
requiring Enron to take a write-down, the auditors succumbed to pressure from 
Enron’s management and permitted the company to defer recognizing the charges 
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(Bratton, 2002: 63-70; Healy and Palepu, 2002: 21-22; Wall Street Journal, 21 
January 2002).  
 
Whether, of course, the above, highly summarised arguments, explain the 
concentration of corporate frauds that have emerged over the last few years is 
ultimately an empirical question, the answer to which has yet to fully emerge. The 
available evidence, however, is highly suggestive. Not only does the evidence indicate 
that non-audit fees increase the incidence of earnings management (Frankel et al, 
2002), not only does it suggest that the balance sheet has become increasingly 
disaggregated, but it also suggests that the transformation of audit firms into multi-
disciplinary professional service firms is reflected in a massive increase in the number 
of earnings restatements by public companies in the 1980s and 1990s. From just 3 in 
1981, these climbed steadily during the 1980s, averaged 49 per year between 1990 
and 1997 and then, once after the SEC began to address the problem, increased to 91 
in 1998, 150 in 1999, 156 in 2000 and 270 in 2001 (Huron Consulting Group, 2002; 
http://www.fei.org/download/QualFinRep-6-13-2k1.ppt.). Each year the amounts 
involved increased substantially, indicating that the large accounting firms had long 
been complicit in earnings management, particularly the premature recognition of 
revenue – which could no longer be sustained (Coffee, 2002: 8-9). The question, 
however, remains - why does such a poor media of control occupy such a central role 
in the general apparatus of fraud surveillance and detection? 
 
The Triumph of Form over Content in US Corporate Governance 
 
The first, and perhaps, the most important reason is that the system in the US - 
although complex, multi-layered and, in a sense, comprehensive - was almost 
designed to fail as it was, and continues to be, based on the idea of independent 
monitoring by directors, auditors and regulators who have poor and incomplete access 
to information and little motivation to scrutinize further (Ribstein, 2002). This, to a 
large extent, is as true for accounting as it is for other, less independent, services 
which ostensibly perform a role in financial regulation. Significantly, in the context of 
the present discussion, this is a product of how the system was originally designed 
(Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2002: 21). When the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was originally introduced, Congress simply ignored 
the fact that the traditional client relationship between accountant and company 
implied that ‘the accountant was a trusted and confidential advisor to the company 
only.’ (O’Connor, 2002: 8) Independence, in other words, was, from the outset, 
simply a term applied to the nature of the new requirement of a statutory audit. The 
relational position of accountants relative to their clients, underpinned by the fact that 
the auditee paid the auditor, remained the same. Problems with audit firm 
independence and the failure to detect fraud have recurred ever since. The alleged 
fraud at Enron is not new, but simply a recent example of accounting manipulation 
that predates the current era of globalisation (ibid: 25; The Washington Post, 10 
February 2002). What is important, in the context of this discussion, however, is that 
the compromised position of accountants, as well as their failure to detect fraud is, at 
least in part, a function of the historical development of financial regulation in the US 
and not easily explained in terms of the emergence of regulatory competition in a 
globalised economy. The question, however, remains – why has the state not 
intervened to rectify these problems? 
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To understand the answer to this question is it important first to realise that (unlike the 
case of environmental or health and safety legislation) competitive deregulation of 
accounting standards may benefit individual corporations in the short term but it does 
nothing to promote the interests of capital in general in the medium or long term. This 
is because, consistent and generally applicable accounting standards, introduced to 
offset the protective effects of limited liability, exist to promote the interests of 
institutional, corporate and individual investors. And where accounting standards do 
not appear to be either consistent or universally observed, and financial information is 
unreliable, the effect is a general sense of insecurity and decline in investor 
confidence. This is precisely what has happened in the US. One poll in July 2002, for 
example, reported that 73 per cent of a random sample of the public said that the 
practice of audits concealing information prejudicial to a company was widespread 
(USA Today, 10 July 2002). Similarly, an earlier poll found that 57 per cent of people 
did not trust corporate executives or brokerage firms to give them honest information 
and that a third thought that the events at Enron were typical of most or many 
corporations (Wall Street Journal, 13 June 2002.). That this loss of confidence has led 
to a decline in investment is less clear, not least because it is difficult to disentangle 
how much of the rise in share prices in the 1990s was due to fraud. The available 
evidence, however, suggests that the widespread fraud and false accounting has had a 
material impact on US stock markets and corporations, causing a decline in foreign 
investment in the US, losses of firm value, generally lower stock prices and a 
reduction in the supply of short-term credit (Financial Times, 27 June 2002; Eduardo 
et al, 2002; The New York Times, 4 August 2002; Wall Street Journal, 28 March 
2002). There is, in short, no real economic value in ineffective financial regulation. 
Investment in the medium and long term gravitates to those companies with higher 
accounting standards where profits are predictable. It is, therefore, more plausible to 
understand why the state’s failure to rectify the basic conflicts of interests that 
characterise US financial regulation first, in terms of the philosophy that underpins 
US financial regulation and second, in terms of the uneven corporate colonisation of 
US government. 
 
The overarching philosophy that has traditionally underpinned financial regulation in 
the US is characterised by two main assumptions. The first is that direct state and 
federal regulation generally represents an unacceptable infringement on managerial 
autonomy. The second is that regulation, where possible, should facilitate the interests 
of US corporations. This is captured perfectly in Harvey Pitt’s assertion, once he had 
taken control of the SEC, that the Commission would become ‘a kinder and gentler 
place for accountants’ (The Guardian, 7 November 2002). The fundamental problem 
with this approach in the context of financial regulation, a problem which Pitt’s 
comments provide important clues to, is that the interests of US capital are not 
homogenous. A good example in the context of financial reporting is that auditors, 
who might want to use their flexibility and ability to obscure as a selling point, have 
different interests from fund managers, who value predictability and transparency. 
The important questions, of course, are which interests are prioritised and why.  The 
best available answer, certainly in the context of the available evidence, seems to 
reside in the degenerate form that politics now takes in the US. 
 
Put simply, the SEC’s policy on auditing has been shaped by political lobbying 
which, in this context at least, seems to have developed in relative autonomy from the 
gradual integration of the world economy. At most this policy might be related to 
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globalisation only in the sense that it has helped to create an environment in which 
such lobbying is accepted, but as a policy it is certainly not reducible to the processes 
of globalisation. US accounting firms have simply been very effective at ensuring that 
their interests are reflected in government policy and regulatory practice. 
 
Despite the fact that, in the pre-Enron era, the SEC never successfully intervened to 
force audit firms to divest themselves of their consulting businesses, its senior 
management were aware that the conflicts of interest that accounting diversification 
implied were, at some level, implicated in earnings management (Levitt, 1998; 
Turner, 2002). This, as we saw above, had become a major problem that had become 
considerably worse during the 1990s in the wake of changes in the legal liability of 
accountants. These generally decreased the legal risks, and, therefore, costs, that 
accountants faced. Intensive lobbying of state legislatures, for instance, served to 
‘assure the passage of statutes recognizing the limited liability partnership’ (Bratton, 
2002: 70). More generally, a number of Supreme Court decisions, making it more 
difficult for private plaintiffs to seek legal address against accountants, the 
introduction of new legislation restricting class actions for fraud and a decline in 
enforcement action by the SEC in the 1980s (in part response to the fact that the 
consolidation of the accounting profession had meant that the large accounting firms 
had far greater resources to contest regulatory action), had served to reduce the risks 
of earnings management for accountants (Coffee, 2002: 12-14). As a result, the SEC 
did attempt to force a formal and complete separation of auditing and consulting. In 
the event, however, it was frustrated. Intensive lobbying by the large accounting firms 
in Washington forced the SEC to back down and a compromise was sought (New 
York Times, 18 January 2002; New York Times, 25 July 2002). As Levitt later put it: 
‘An extraordinary amount of political pressure was brought to bear on the 
Commission. We ended up with the best possible solution – given the realities of the 
time (Levitt, 2002: 76).’ This process, in which political influence of corporations has 
imposed massive constraints on the SEC’s attempts to control the accounting industry 
and, therefore, minimise the likelihood of systemic failure, became institutionalised 
when Harvey Pitt, a commercial lawyer who previously acted for the large accounting 
firms, took over the chair of the SEC (for examples of Pitt’s defence of the accounting 
profession in the post Enron era see Wall Street Journal, 11 December, 2001). 
 
There are other examples of the effectiveness of political lobbying by the accounting 
profession (New York Times, 24 July 2002). What is important, however, is that it is 
difficult to justify these compromises on the basis of allowing accountants to compete 
internationally or on the basis of ensuring that accountants did not relocate outside of 
the US. Accounting firms are already international and, as a service industry, cannot 
so easily be based beyond the legal jurisdiction and immediate location of the markets 
they service. Instead, it seems better to accept that corporations are not necessarily 
concerned with the efficient allocation of capital and that, ever since the creation of 
the SEC, some commercial organisations, in this case accountants, have successfully 
lobbied the state to limit independent oversight which might, otherwise, optimise the 
efficient allocation of capital. In short, auditing in the US fails, in part, because it was 
and continues to be based on a false premise, in part, because it is underpinned by a 
corrupting philosophy, and, in part, because, as a result of uneven political access, it 
has never been allowed to adapt to the transition of the accounting firm from an 
institution that once emphasised professionalism to one that now emphasizes the 
maximisation of profit.  
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